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Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in 
Comparative Cognition was born out of a 
meeting on animal thinking through the 
Ernst Strüngmann Forum. The Forum’s 
main objective is for the continual advance-
ment of scientific knowledge facilitated by 
bringing together leading experts to address 
high-priority areas of interest from multiple 
vantage points. Editors Menzel and Fischer 
proposed a Forum on comparative cogni-
tion to address key topics in the field and 
to clarify points of contention and highlight 
progress, both past and potential. This vol-
ume is the culmination of the joint effort 
of an impressive list of 46 leading experts 
in the field of comparative cognition. Four 
key areas in animal thinking were addressed 
in the book in separate sections, including 
navigation, decision making and plan-
ning, communication, and social knowl-
edge, for a total of 18 chapters. There were 
summary chapters following each section 
that reviewed the key points and discussed 
potential areas for new research to fur-
ther advance these subfields, all of which 
reflected back on one key topic – animal 
thinking.
Should the phrase “animals think” be a 
question or a statement? Should we now 
conclude that non-human animals have 
thought processes on par with humans? 
Comparative psychology has historically 
straddled the fence between defaulting 
to over-simplified, non-mental accounts 
that animals are merely stimulus-response 
machines to over-qualifying animal behav-
ior with unfounded complex and highly 
mentalistic interpretations. Editors Menzel 
and Fischer address the issue of the proper 
interpretation of animal behavior as it man-
ifests in multiple subfields within cognitive 
psychology. In doing so, they intentionally 
left the question mark off of their title, 
Animal Thinking. However, they also cor-
rectly noted that in doing this, they were not 
arguing that similarity in behavior across 
species means similarity in the mechanisms 
underlying such behaviors. They instead 
noted that bringing animals into the fold 
of cognitive agents, when it is appropriate 
to do so, helps us better understand human 
cognition – whereas a non-comparative 
approach may have blocked progress in 
understanding our own minds when it iso-
lated human cognition as somehow special 
and independent of the effects of biological 
(and psychological) evolution.
Along these same lines, Menzel and 
Fischer discussed a major point of conten-
tion in cognitive psychology: the principle 
of parsimony, which states that the sim-
pler of two competing theories should be 
preferred. For animal behavior, this means 
that the least complex explanation that can 
account for an observed behavior should 
be given priority. However, this does not 
mean that any behavior by a non-human 
animal must be explained by simple rules 
and associations. Instead, the principle of 
parsimony must be applied appropriately 
as to avoid superfluous interpretations of 
behavioral phenomena, keeping in mind 
that this default assumption is not always 
appropriate and sometimes, a more cogni-
tively enriched interpretation may fit the bill 
(Smith et al., 2012; also see Shettleworth, 
2010).
Some parts of the book merit special 
mention. We enjoyed the discussion of the 
“navigation toolbox” of increasing cognitive 
complexity, which was proposed to include 
map-less navigation through navigational 
planning (i.e., eliciting a cognitive map). We 
found Stevens’ chapter on mechanisms for 
future decisions to be particularly thought 
provoking and important to understanding 
how animals sort through the large number 
of decisions they are faced with daily. His 
discussion on bounded rationality nicely 
outlined the prevalence of mechanisms with 
simple decision rules over complex compu-
tations that yield similar outcomes. He also 
highlighted that animals (including those 
of the human variety) are not necessarily 
optimal decision makers, yet may use simple 
heuristics that approach optimal outcomes.
Jensen et al. defined social cognition as 
a suite of cognitive processes that allow an 
animal to navigate its ever-changing social 
environment. The authors note the chal-
lenge in identifying these mechanisms and 
the difficulty in distinguishing how multi-
ple species might employ different cognitive 
processes to culminate in the same func-
tional outcome. These authors also explored 
whether social and physical cognition are 
truly distinct in nature, or rather influence 
and build upon one another, suggesting 
that while the two are different, they are 
not separate. This is an idea that has cap-
tured our own attention of late, particularly 
as we have begun examining the cognitive 
processes underlying social behavior and 
the study of how physical cognition can 
be impacted by an animal’s social environ-
ment. Cheney’s discussion of the potential 
contributions of some cognitive processes 
(e.g., planning, metacognition) to social 
behavior such as cooperation is also note-
worthy in this regard, and we agreed that 
this perspective continues to be vitally 
important. Hampton’s reminder that lab 
researchers should look for natural situ-
ations that evoke the cognitive processes 
studied in the lab is also an important one 
to remember.
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Many of the authors reminded the reader 
that comparative cognition must remain 
 committed to the “comparative” part of its 
mission by assessing as many species as can 
be tested fairly and appropriately given the 
natural  tendencies and behavioral potentials 
of each given species. Bshary et al. convinc-
ingly argued that “species fair” tests are critical 
to continued development of a truly com-
parative psychology (e.g., the Transfer Index; 
Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984), and one must 
remember that just because multiple species 
can be presented with the same task does not 
mean that one is “giving the same test.” Results 
of poorly conceived tests may over- or under-
estimate a species’ true abilities, handicapping 
or unfairly  promoting what those species 
might show by way of  cognitive competence.
We recommend this book to anyone who 
is interested in “animal thinking” in general, 
whether you want the question mark to end 
that phrase or not, because it appropriately 
addresses the ongoing debate about how to 
interpret animal behavior. Although this 
book is probably not introductory or com-
prehensive enough to serve as an all-encom-
passing guide to comparative cognition, this 
is also not its mission, whereas it serves as a 
valuable resource for graduate students and 
researchers in comparative psychology inter-
ested in the contemporary issues in the field.
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